We have it; prudence dictates we keep it. There lies the core of the government's case for updating Britain's Trident nuclear weapons system. Tony Blair says we live in a dangerous world. Who could quarrel with that? The decision to maintain a strategic nuclear capability until 2050 and beyond has another, unspoken aim. It seeks to sustain Britain in the front ranks of world powers. There was never any doubt that Mr Blair would advocate replacement of the Trident submarines; nor that Gordon Brown, his likely successor, would support him. To do otherwise would accept that a shifting balance of power will afford Britain a diminished global role. Messrs Blair and Brown may disagree on most things, but neither claims modesty about Britain's place in the world. Thus a promised national debate will follow rather than precede the government's decision. The government cannot argue that a strategic nuclear capability is vital to Britain's future security. Had it not already possessed the bomb it is inconceivable that any government would now seriously contemplate its acquisition. The same would be true were the cost of replacing Trident, say, three or four times higher than the official estimate of £15bn-£20bn. What Mr Blair might have decided were France set on phasing out its nuclear capability is a finer judgment. Suffice it to say that few senior British politicians could contemplate the prospect of France remaining as Europe's sole nuclear power. None of this reasoning, of course, appears in the white paper. The seat-at-the-top-table argument carries little popular resonance - and, notionally at least, France remains an ally. Mr Blair instead concentrates on the uncertainties. Fifty years ago, when Britain first acquired the bomb, we would not have recognised the world as it is today. The same should be said of prospects in 2050. The white paper divides the potential threats into three. The first comes from what are called the major nuclear powers. Since neither the US, nor France, would contemplate obliterating London, that means Russia and China. The second category comprises regional nuclear powers. A simple list of these would include India and Israel; but the risks are deemed to come from so-called "rogue" states such as North Korea and, if its programme is successful, Iran. The third set of possible threats is said to derive from potential sponsors of nuclear terrorists - regimes that, while unwilling or unable to launch attacks themselves, might choose to arm terrorists. Someone somewhere might hand over a bomb to jihadis. The ordering here is not coincidental. The present foreign policy posture of Vladimir Putin's Russia makes the first category of threat more credible than it seemed a few years ago. The strategic impact of China's rise is unknown. But the government's deterrent theory looks threadbare by the time it reaches rogue states arming nuclear terrorists. The best Mr Blair could say is that this scenario is not "utterly fanciful". There are dangers - what Donald Rumsfeld famously called known and unknown unknowns. Any assessment of what the world might look like between 2025 and 2055 - the expected lifespan of a new system - necessarily throws up an abundance of risks. The cold strategic calculation, though, must be whether they are sufficiently plausible to merit the huge costs of a new strategic weapons system. These costs are political as well as financial. I am not among those who believe that a British decision to forgo nuclear weapons would transform prospects for wider disarmament. That said, there comes a point when modernisation of their arsenals robs the existing nuclear powers of all moral authority. Missing, too, from the white paper is a serious appraisal of how any of the threats might arise. There are occasional mentions of Nato and/or collective security, but not much more. Yet, if it is just possible to imagine Britain being menaced by another nuclear state, it is much harder to see that happening except in the context of a broader international crisis. Britain cannot engage in significant conflicts save alongside the US. As the pre-eminent nuclear power, America could scarcely allow others to get away with the nuclear blackmail of an ally. Here, Mr Blair could say only that the risk was "not non-existent". In spite of the plans for fewer warheads and, possibly, a cut to three in the number of submarines, the price tag is likely to far exceed the present estimate. Even if the capital cost were held down to £15bn or £20bn, that represents a huge insurance premium against a risk acknowledged as, at most, slight. Those who share Mr Blair's wish that Britain remain a power capable of military intervention around the world will back the decision to replace Trident. Those who believe, as I do, that the time has come to forgo military prestige for a different role in global affairs, can think of better ways to spend £20bn. But, as Mr Blair says, it is a matter of judgment.
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